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Why do bank runs look like panic? 
A new explanation 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 19/2006 
Yehning Chen – Iftekhar Hasan 




This paper demonstrates that, even if depositors are fully rational and always 
choose the Pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria, a bank 
run may still occur when depositors’ expectations of the bank’s fundamentals do 
not change. More specifically, a bank run may occur when depositors learn that 
noisy bank-specific information is revealed, or when they learn that precise bank-
specific information is not revealed. The results in this paper are consistent with 
empirical evidence about bank runs. It also implies that suspension of 
convertibility can improve the efficiency of bank runs. 
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Ilmentävätkö talletuspaot tallettajien pakokauhua vai 
rationaalista käyttäytymistä? Uuden teorian tarkastelua 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 19/2006 
Yehning Chen – Iftekhar Hasan 




Tässä tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että rationaalisesti käyttäytyvien ja monesta mah-
dollisesta parhaan tasapainon valitsevien tallettajien tapauksessakin talletuspako 
pankeista on mahdollinen, kun tallettajien käsitykset pankkien talouden perusteki-
jöistä ei muutu. Täsmällisemmin ilmaisten talletuspako on mahdollinen, kun tal-
lettajat saavat puutteellista pankkikohtaista tietoa tai kun heille selviää, ettei heille 
paljasteta täsmällistä pankkikohtaista tietoa. Työn tulokset ovat sopusoinnussa tal-
letuspakoja koskevan empiirisen näytön kanssa. Analyysista seuraa myös, että 
valuutan vaihdettavuuden lykkääminen lisää tallettajien hyvinvointia. 
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Even though most empirical studies conclude that bank runs are associated with 
adverse information about banks,
1 the view that bank runs are caused by depositor 
panic is still popular because some features of bank runs cannot be fully explained 
by negative bank-specific information. For example, during large scale bank runs 
depositors usually do not distinguish between good and bad banks; they rush to all 
banks to withdraw deposits. An example is the 1932 Chicago Banking Crisis.
2 
During the first week of that crisis (late June of 1932), massive withdrawals 
occurred from all banks in Chicago. Since it is unlikely that all the banks in 
Chicago were in terrible financial conditions that deserved a bank run, it is fair to 
say that during this crisis some banks in Chicago suffered runs even if they 
appeared sound.
3 Runs occurring to these banks may look more like depositor 
panic rather than the rational response of depositors to negative bank-specific 
information. 
  In this paper, we propose a new theory to explain why bank runs look like a 
panic. We define a panic run as a bank run that occurs when depositors’ 
expectations of the bank’s fundamentals do not change. In our model, panic runs 
are triggered by changes in depositors’ expectations of the bank-specific 
information process. More specifically, depositors may start a run when they 
expect that more noisy information about banks will be revealed, or when they 
expect that precise information about banks will not be revealed. We show that 
panic runs can occur even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the 
Pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria. 
  The intuition of our model can be explained as follows. Consider a bank that 
collects deposits to invest in risky assets. Suppose that depositors demand 
liquidity and the bank provides it by allowing early withdrawing depositors to 
consume more than the liquidation values of their deposits. Moreover, depositors 
may receive an interim signal about the return on the bank’s assets. 
  In this setting, whether information-based bank runs can improve depositor 
welfare depends on the quality of the signal about bank assets. If the signal is 
relatively precise, information-based runs are beneficial because they can serve as 
a mechanism to efficiently liquidate the bank when its continuation value is lower 
than the liquidation value. On the other hand, if the signal is informative
4 but 
                                                 
1 For example, see Calomiris and Mason (1997, 2003), Hasan and Dwyer (1994), Mishkin (1991), 
Saunders and Wilson (1996), and Schumacher (2000). 
2 For an excellent investigation of the 1932 Chicago banking crisis, please see Calomiris and 
Mason (1997). 
3 As mentioned in p. 886 in Calomiris and Mason (1997), the Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
(July 2, 1932, 70–71) specifically noted that even healthy banks such as First Chicago were also 
affected by this event. 
4 That is, it can trigger a bank run when its realized value infers bad news about the bank.  
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relatively noisy, then information-based runs will reduce depositor welfare. As 
shown in Chen and Hasan (2006), a deposit contract that provides liquidity will 
induce depositors to have excessive incentives to withdraw. The excessive 
incentives to withdraw may force depositors to respond to mildly adverse 
information about the bank and start a bank run even if they would be better off if 
the run did not happen. 
  The above results help explain why panic runs occur. At any point in time 
after they deposit, depositors can decide whether to withdraw immediately or to 
wait, and a bank run will occur when the depositors’ expected payoff for waiting 
is lower than what they can receive from successfully withdrawing. When 
depositors learn that a relatively noisy (but still informative) signal will be 
revealed, they realize that a welfare decreasing bank run is more likely to occur, 
so their payoff for waiting becomes lower. Similarly, when depositors learn that a 
precise signal will not be revealed, they realize that they will not be able to use the 
signal for triggering a welfare improving bank run, so their payoff for waiting also 
becomes lower. In both cases, the reduction in depositors’ expected payoff for 
waiting may lead to a panic run. 
  In a more general sense, our results illustrate that information not only has the 
direct effect of changing posteriors, but also has the indirect effect of moving 
players along the game tree and affecting backwards induction calculations.
5 As 
the information structure changes, depositors know that they will face different 
situations in the future, so their incentives to withdraw also change. Therefore, a 
bank run can happen even if depositors’ beliefs about the bank’s financial 
condition does not change. 
  The model has several interesting implications. First, panic runs are more 
likely to occur when the prospects of the banking industry are poor, since when 
the prior probability of a bank failure is higher, the depositors’ payoff from 
waiting to withdraw is lower. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence 
that large scale bank runs usually follow adverse information about banks. 
  Second, during bad times for banks, a bank whose financial condition does 
not appear weak may experience a panic run. As the health of the banking 
industry becomes the focus of public attention, more bank-specific information is 
likely to be revealed in the media. Even if a bank’s fundamentals appear sound, 
concern that more noisy bank-specific information will be revealed may lead 
depositors to exit. This provides an explanation for why bank runs occur to all 
banks rather than to only bad ones during large scale banking crises. 
  Third, our model implies that suspension of convertibility can raise depositor 
welfare. When a panic run occurs, suspension of convertibility forces depositors 
to delay their withdrawal decisions until more information is revealed, so fewer 
solvent banks will be liquidated. This prediction is consistent with the result in 
                                                 
5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the general intuitions of our results.  
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Dwyer and Hasan (2006) that suspension of payments reduces the probability of a 
bank closure by twenty five percent. 
  Our paper is related to the classical work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
(DD), who interpret a bank run as the result that depositors choose a Pareto 
dominated equilibrium. As in DD, in our model panic runs can occur and 
suspension of convertibility can alleviate the panic run problem.
6 However, the 
empirical implications are different. While a panic run in DD can happen 
randomly, our model predicts that panic runs are more likely to occur when the 
banking industry is weaker. Also, the ways that suspension of convertibility 
alleviates the panic run problem differ. In DD, suspension of convertibility 
ensures that enough resources will be reserved in the bank for depositors who 
withdraw late. Knowing this, depositors without liquidity needs will not withdraw 
early. In contrast, in our model suspension of convertibility eliminates panic runs 
by forcing depositors to delay their withdrawal decisions until more information is 
revealed. 
  In terms of model setting and basic ideas, this paper is similar to Chen (1999) 
and Chen and Hasan (2006). It extends that framework to show that a bank run 
can be triggered not only by bank-specific information, but also by depositors’ 
expectations about the amount and quality of bank-specific information that will 
be revealed. Chari and Jagannathan (1988) also study bank runs and suspension of 
convertibility, but the bank runs in their paper are information driven, so do not fit 
our definition of panic runs. 
  Finally, Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) establish a model in which depositors 
receive private noisy information about bank assets, and demonstrate that 
fundamentals about banks can uniquely determine whether a bank run occurs. 
They define a panic run as a bank run that occurs despite the fact that no agent 
would have run if he believed no other agent was going to run. The panic run in 
our paper differs from theirs. In our model, a panic run occurs even if bank 
fundamentals do not change, while panic runs in their model are information 
driven. Also, in our model the depositors’ withdrawal decisions during a panic run 
will not be affected by their belief about others’ strategies. That is, they would 
withdraw even if they believed that all the others (except those with liquidity 
needs) would not withdraw.
7 In contrast to Goldstein and Pauzner who emphasize 
that bank runs can still be explained as panic-based when the equilibrium is 
uniquely determined, we focus on how changes in the information structure lead 
to panic runs. The two definitions capture important but different features of panic 
bank runs. 
                                                 
6 In DD, the bank’s investment is risk free, so its fundamentals never change. Therefore, the bank 
run in their paper fits our definition of a panic run (that is, a bank run that occurs even if 
depositors’ expectations of the bank’s fundamentals do not change). 
7 We have this result because we assume that depositors choose the Pareto dominant equilibrium 
when there are multiple equilibria. For more detail, please see the analysis in Section 3.  
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  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. 
Section 3 is the analysis of the model. Concluding remarks are in Section 4. 
 
 
2 The  model 
This is a three-date (dates 0, 1, and 2) model. There are numerous atomistic 
depositors and one bank. At date 0, each depositor receives an endowment of one 
dollar. A depositor can either deposit the endowment at the bank, or invest it in a 
long-term divisible project that matures at date 2. For each dollar invested, the 
project yields R with probability p and nothing with probability 1 – p, where p is a 
random variable and p  =  p0 a t  d a t e  0 .  A s s u m e  t h a t  p 0 R  >  1, so the project’s 
expected rate of return is positive. The project can be liquidated at date 1. For 
each dollar invested at date 0, liquidation yields one dollar at date 1. For 
simplicity, assume that the returns on all the long-term projects are perfectly 
correlated. 
  Some depositors face liquidity shocks and have to consume at date 1. The 
others can consume at either date 1 or date 2. Depositors of type i must consume 
by date i (i = 1,2). The proportion of type-1 depositors is t, where t is a constant. 
At date 0, depositors are symmetric: they do not know their types, and each of 
them has the same probability of becoming a type-1 depositor. Depositors learn 
their types at date 1. Depositors are risk neutral. However, a type-1 depositor that 
consumes less than r at date 1 suffers a liquidity loss in utility, X, where r and X 
are constants with r > 1 and X > 0. Let Ui denote the utility function of a type-i 
depositor, and cj denote the depositor’s consumption at date j. The depositors’ 
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  At date 1, depositors may receive a public signal, s, about p. At date 0, it is 
common knowledge that s will be revealed with probability α and will not be 
revealed with probability 1 – α, where α is a constant. The value of s is either H 
or L. If the return on the projects will be R, then s = H with probability q and 
s = L with probability 1 – q; if the return on the long-term projects will be 0, then 
s = H with probability 1 – q and s = L with probability q, where 0.5 ≤ q ≤ 1 and q 
reflects the precision of the signal. Let pH and pL denote the probabilities that the 
projects’ return is R given s = H and s = L, respectively. Then 
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≡  (2.1) 
 
By equation (2.1), pH is increasing in q and pL is decreasing in q. 
  We divide date 1 into two consecutive subdates: subdates 1.1 and 1.2. At 
subdate 1.1, depositors learn whether s will be revealed at subdate 1.2. Depositors 
also learn their types at subdate 1.2. They learn their type and the value of s 
simultaneously when s is revealed. 
  A type-1 depositor who invests independently has to liquidate the project at 
date 1 and suffer the liquidity loss. Hence, the existence of a bank may improve 
depositor welfare. At date 0, the bank collects money from depositors and invests 
the proceeds in the project; it also offers a deposit contract (d1, d2) to depositors. 
For each dollar deposited, the bank promises to pay d1 if the depositor withdraws 
at any subdate of date 1, and pay d2 if the depositor withdraws at date 2 after the 
bank’s investment matures.
8 
  When depositors withdraw, the bank cannot distinguish between type-1 and 
type-2 depositors and depositors are sequentially served. There is no deposit 
insurance. The banking industry is competitive, so the bank’s expected profit is 
zero. For now, we assume that suspension of convertibility is not allowed, so the 
bank has to open at date 1 unless it runs out of money. Finally, we assume that the 
















min t  (2.2) 
 
The reasons for requiring (2.2) will become clear in the next section. 
 
 
                                                 
8 In this paper, we do not consider more sophisticated deposit contracts, such as contracts in which 
payouts can be contingent on the public signal. We do so because it is difficult to enforce these 
more sophisticated contracts in practice.  
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3  The analysis of the model 
This section establishes conditions under which a bank run will occur. For 
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≡  (3.1) 
 
Note that by (2.2), t < (R – r)/(r R – r), which implies 
*
1 d  is strictly less than 
*
2 d.  I f  
d1 ≥ d2, all depositors would withdraw at date 1. 
  The game is solved backwards. To simplify exposition, we study only 
symmetric pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. Given this criterion, 
there are two equilibrium candidates in each date 1 subgame. At subdates 1.1, 
either all depositors withdraw or no depositor withdraws. At subdate 1.2, either all 
depositors withdraw or only type-1 depositors withdraw. We will say that a bank 
run occurs if all depositors withdraw at any subdate of date 1. Also, we assume 
that depositors choose a Pareto Dominant equilibrium when there are multiple 
equilibria.
10 As in DD and Chen (1999), a bank run can always be sustained as an 
equilibrium, and it is always Pareto dominated when there are multiple 
equilibria.
11 Therefore, in our model a bank run occurs if and only if it is the only 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
12 
  A bank run that occurs at subdate 1.1 is a panic run since no new information 
about the bank’s project has been revealed yet. To show that a bank run may 
occur at subdate 1.1, we first consider the subgame of subdate 1.2. Suppose that 
                                                 




1 d d , ) is the optimal deposit contract when providing liquidity is an 
important concern for designing the deposit contract. To allow type-1 depositors to avoid liquidity 
losses, the bank must set d1 ≥ r. However, setting d1 > r is not optimal for two reasons. First, the 
higher is the d1, the less money the bank can invest in the profitable long-term project. Second, 
given d1 > 1 and d2 < R, depositors have excessive incentives to withdraw at date 1. An increase in 
d1 will worsen this problem. Therefore, the optimal d1 is r. Given d1 = r, the bank’s zero-profit 
condition implies d2 = 
*
2 d . 
10 The purpose of making this assumption is to demonstrate the point that information-based bank 
runs are still inefficient even if depositors choose the Pareto Dominant equilibrium. 
11 If ‘no depositor withdraws’ can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in a date 1 subgame, the 
depositors’ equilibrium payoff must be no smaller than r. In the bank run equilibrium, the 
depositors’ payoff is VBR in equation (3.3) below, which is strictly less than 1. 
12 If the bank’s payouts can be contingent on the public signal, the optimal deposit contract and the 









1 d d , ) when s = H, and (d1, d2) = (1, R) when s = L. Intuitively, this signal-contingent deposit 
contract allows the bank to stop providing liquidity when an inefficient bank run is a concern (that 
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1 d d , ) may not be optimal when payouts can be contingent on s.  
13 
no depositor has withdrawn at subdate 1.1. At subdate 1.2, type-1 depositors will 
withdraw. The type-2 depositors’ incentives to withdraw depend on their belief 
about others’ strategies. Given the realization of p,
13 if a type-2 depositor believes 
that no other type-2 depositors will withdraw, his payoffs for withdrawing and for 
not withdrawing are 
*
t d  = r  and 
*
2 d p , respectively. Therefore, ‘only type-1 
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Hence, a bank run will occur if and only if p < pN. 
  Note that a bank run that occurs at subdate 1.2 may be inefficient. When a 
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Because r > 1 and VBR < 1, we know that VBR < r. On the other hand, given p, 
depositor welfare when a bank run does not occur at subdate 1.2 is 
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If depositors could coordinate to maximize their joint welfare, they would start a 
bank run if and only if VNW(p) < VBR, or equivalently 
 
R ) r t 1 (





≡ <  (3.5) 
 
By (2.2), the p* defined in (3.5) is strictly positive, so a bank run improves 
depositor welfare when p is sufficiently low. It can be easily shown that p* < pN.
15 
Therefore, when p* < p < pN, a bank run occurs even if depositors would be better 
off if it did not happen. 
                                                 
13 Depending on whether s is revealed, the value of p may be p0, pH, or pL. 
14 In (3.3), t and (1–t) are the proportions of type-1 and type-2 depositors, respectively; 1/
*
1 d  and 
(1 – 1/
*
1 d ) are the fractions of depositors who successfully withdraw and who go to the bank after 
the bank runs out of money, respectively. 
15 VNW(p) < r if and only if p < pN. Since VBR < r and VNW is increasing in p, we know that p* < pN.  
14 
  Depositors have excessive incentives to withdraw in our model for two 
reasons. First, to provide liquidity, the bank has to set d1 = r > 1 and d2 < R,
16 
which means depositors receive more than the liquidation values of their deposits 
if they withdraw at date 1, and do not receive the full return of the investment if 
they withdraw at date 2. Second, given d1 > 1, some depositors lose their deposits 
when a bank run occurs; these depositors will suffer the liquidity loss X if they 
become type-1 depositors. However, when deciding whether to withdraw, 
depositors do not take the liquidity losses of other depositors into consideration. 
  To simplify exposition, in the rest of the paper we consider only the case 
where the signal is informative, that is 
 
) q , p ( p p ) q , p ( p 0 H N 0 L < <  (3.6) 
 
Equation (3.6) implies that, if depositors wait until subdate 1.2 and s is revealed, a 
bank run occurs only when s = L. 
  Now consider subdate 1.1, when depositors learn whether s will be revealed at 
subdate 1.2. If s will not be revealed, a bank run occurs at subdate 1.1 if and only 
if p0 < pN. If s will be revealed, the depositors’ payoff for waiting until subdate 1.2 
becomes 
 
BR H 0 H NW H 0 M V ) 1 ( )) q , p ( p ( V ) q , p ( V π − + π ≡  (3.7) 
 
where πH ≡ p0q + (1 – p0)(1 – q) is the prior probability of the event s = H. Then a 
bank run will occur at subdate 1.1 if and only if VM(p0, q) < r. Let pM(q) denote 
the p0 that satisfies VM(p0, q) = r.  Since  VM is strictly increasing in p0, the 
condition VM(p0, q) < r is equivalent to p0 < pM(q). The above results establish the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that depositors deposit at date 0. 
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  In this case, a panic run occurs at subdate 1.1 if and only if p0 < pN. 
 
                                                 
16 N o t e  t h a t  d 1 ≥  r is a necessary condition for the deposit contract to Pareto dominate self-
investing for depositors. Later in this section, we will show the condition under which depositors 
are better off when the bank is formed. This condition justifies why the bank sets d1 = r even if 
doing so may lead to inefficient bank runs.  
15 
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  In this case, a panic run occurs at subdate 1.1 if and only if p0 < pM(q). 
 
Proposition 1 states that a panic run will occur when p0 is low. This result is 
intuitive. The lower is p0, the lower the depositors’ payoff for waiting until 
subdate 1.2 is, so depositors have a stronger incentive to withdraw at subdate 1.1. 
As mentioned, this result is consistent with the observation that large scale bank 
runs follow negative information about banks. 
  At date 0, savers will use banks if the payoff from doing so is higher than 
from self-investing. The depositor’s expected payoff for self-investing is
17 
 
{} . R p ) 1 ( }] R p , 1 max{ ) 1 ( R p [ ) t 1 ( ) X 1 ( t V 0 L H H H 0 α − + π − + π α − + − ≡  (3.10) 
 
On the other hand, the payoff from depositing is  ) p ( W ) 1 ( ) q , p ( W 0 N 0 S α − + α . We 
assume that 
 
0 0 N 0 S V ) p ( W ) 1 ( ) q , p ( W > α − + α  (3.11) 
 
so depositors will make deposits at date 0. It can be easily shown that (3.11) will 
hold when X is high so providing liquidity to type-1 depositors is an important 
concern.
18 We also assume that 
 
r ) p ( W ) 1 ( ) q , p ( W 0 N 0 S > α − + α  (3.12) 
 
which implies that a bank run will not occur at subdate 1.1 before depositors learn 
whether s will be revealed. 
  We next study how the precision of the public signal s affects depositors’ 
behavior. The results are summarized in the following proposition. 
 
                                                 
17 If a depositor becomes a type-1 depositor, his payoff is 1 – X. If a depositor becomes a type-2 
depositor and s will be revealed, s is used to determine whether to liquidate the project. Along with 
the assumption that p0R > 1, we have (3.10). 
18 Intuitively, if a depositor self-invests, he will suffer X with probability one when he turns out to 
be a type-1 depositor. On the other hand, if he makes deposits and becomes a type-1 depositor, he 
suffers X only when (i) a bank run occurs, and (ii) he cannot successfully withdraw from the bank 
(the probability of this event is 1 – 1/r given that a bank run occurs). Therefore, (3.11) holds when 
X is high.  
16 
Proposition 2. 
(a)  If the signal is informative but relatively noisy, depositors are more eager to 
withdraw when they learn that the signal will be revealed. If the signal is 
informative and relatively precise, depositors are more eager to withdraw 
when they learn that the signal will not be revealed. That is, there exists a qC 
in the range (0.5, 1) such that pM(q) > pN if q < qC, and pM(q) < pN if q > qC. 
(b) When the signal is informative but relatively noisy, a panic run occurs at 
subdate 1.1 if pN < p0 < pM(q) and depositors learn that the signal will be 
revealed. When the signal is relatively precise, a panic run occurs at subdate 
1.1 if pM(q) < p0 < pN and depositors learn that the signal will not be revealed. 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2 can be explained as follows. From the above analysis, when s will 
be revealed and no depositor withdraws at subdate 1.1, a welfare decreasing bank 
run will occur at subdate 1.2 if and only if s = L and 
 
N 0 L p ) q , p ( p * p < <  (3.13) 
 
Because pL is decreasing in q, pL(p0, q) is higher than p* only when q is relatively 
low.
19 Therefore, when q is relatively low, s may trigger an inefficient run, so 
depositors are more eager to withdraw when they learn that s will be revealed. In 
contrast, when q is relatively high (so that pL(p0, q) < p*), s can trigger an efficient 
bank run, so depositors are more willing to wait until subdate 1.2 when they learn 
that s will be revealed. 
  The precision of the signal also determines the type of panic runs that will 
occur. When s is relatively noisy (so pN < pM(q)) and pN < p0 < pM(q), nothing 
happens at subdate 1.1 if s will not be revealed (since p0 > pN) and a panic run 
occurs if s will be revealed (since p0 < pM(q)). On the other hand, when s is 
relatively precise (so pM(q) < pN) and pM(q) < p0 < pN, nothing happens at subdate 
1.1 if s will be revealed (since p0 > pM(q)), and a panic run occurs if s will not be 
revealed (since p0 < pN).
20 
  The case where pN < p0 < pM(q) has an interesting implication. Given p0 > pN, 
the bank is sound in the sense that no bank run will occur if no new information 
will be revealed. However, as mentioned, a panic run will occur in this case if 
depositors learn that s will be revealed. The result that a panic run can occur at a 
sound bank provides an explanation for why all banks rather than only the 
                                                 
19 Note that equation (3.6) excludes the possibility that pL(p0, q) ≥ pN. 
20 Note that (3.12) implies p0 > min{pN, pM(q)}. If p0 ≤ min{pN, pM(q)}, by Proposition 1 a 
depositor’s expected payoff for making deposits is no larger than r, which violates (3.12).  
17 
financially weak ones suffer massive withdrawals during large scale banking 
panic. 
  A policy implication that follows from this analysis is that suspension of 
convertibility can alleviate the panic run problem. Depositor welfare may be 
higher if the bank suspends convertibility at subdate 1.1 and allows depositors to 
withdraw only at subdate 1.2. 
 
Proposition 3. If pN < p0 < pM(q), then allowing the bank to suspend 
convertibility at subdate 1.1 strictly improves depositor welfare. 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 3 states a condition under which suspension of convertibility strictly 
improves depositor welfare. Suppose pN < p0 < pM(q) and depositors learn that s 
will be revealed. In this case, a panic run always occurs at subdate 1.1 if there is 
no suspension of convertibility. By contrast, if convertibility is suspended at 
subdate 1.1, a bank run will occur at subdate 1.2 only when s = L. By forcing 
depositors to delay withdrawing decisions until s is revealed, suspension of 
payments reduces the probability of a bank run. Since the bank run equilibrium is 
always Pareto dominated, reducing the probability of a bank run is welfare 
improving. This result is consistent with the observation of Dwyer and Hasan 
(2006) that suspension of payments reduces the probability of a bank closure by 
twenty five percent. 
  Two caveats of the model are worth mentioning. First, the assumption about 
the bank’s return is critical to our results. A necessary condition for Proposition 2 
to hold is that information-based bank runs are welfare improving when bank-
specific information is relatively precise. Under the assumption that the bank’s 
return is either R or 0, the bank’s conditional return given s is either very large 
(close to R) or very small (close to 0) as the signal becomes precise, so an 
information-based run is always welfare improving when s is relatively precise. If 
the bank’s return is continuously distributed, an information-based bank run may 
still be welfare decreasing even if the signal is perfect.
21 It may seem then, that 
our main result (Proposition 2) is not robust. However, we do not consider this as 
a serious problem since our simple assumption about the bank return captures the 
feature that information-based bank runs can play a positive role in disciplining 
banks when bank-specific information is precise. We conjecture that, even if some 
                                                 
21 To see this, suppose that the return on the bank’s project is continuously distributed, and 
depositors perfectly learn the realized return at date 1. Let y denote the realized return. Assume 
that a bank run is welfare improving if and only if y < y*, and that a bank run will occur if and 
only if y < yN. Since depositors still have excessive incentives to withdraw in our model, we know 
that y* < yN. Therefore, an inefficient bank run occurs when y* < y < yN.  
18 
assumptions of the model are changed, our results will hold as long as this feature 
is preserved. 
  The second caveat is that, when discussing suspension of payments, we do not 
consider other costs that may be incurred. In particular, when a bank’s payments 
are suspended, depositors who need liquidity urgently will suffer losses. When 
these costs are considered, suspension of convertibility can be justified only when 




4 Concluding  remarks 
This paper shows that the depositors’ expectations about the quality and amount 
of bank-related information that will be revealed can affect their incentives to 
withdraw. It provides an explanation for why bank runs may look like panic, and 
generates results that are consistent with the empirical evidence about bank runs. 
Extending the model to investigate how bank regulations such as capital 
requirements and deposit insurance affect the panic run problem is left for future 
research. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2 
For part (a) of the proposition, since VM is increasing in p0, pM(q ) > pN if and only 
if VM(pN, q) < r = VNW(pN). By (3.7) and the fact that 
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Note that pL is decreasing in q and p* is independent of q. Moreover, pL(pN, 0.5) = 
pN and pL(pN, 1) = 0. Therefore, there exists a qC ∈ (0.5, 1) such that pL(pN, q) > 
p* if and only if q < qC. This completes the proof of part (a). For part (b), note that 
(3.12) implies p0 > min{pN, pM(q)}. If q < qC, a panic run will occur if and only if 
pN < p0 < pM(q) and s will be revealed. If q > qC, a panic run will occur if and only 
if pM(q) < p0 < pN and s will not be revealed. This completes the proof of the 
proposition.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
When pN < p0 < pM(q), the depositors’ payoff at date 0 is α VBR + (1 – α)VNW(p0) 
when there is no suspension of convertibility, and is α VM(p0, q) + (1 – α) VNW(p0) 
when there is. Therefore, suspension of convertibility raises depositor welfare if 
and only if VM(p0, q) > VBR, or equivalently, VNW(pH(p0, q)) > VBR. By (3.3) and 
(3.6), we know that VNW(pH(p0, q)) > r > VBR. This completes the proof of the 
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